As President Obama headed to Russia, the American news media highlighted the negative views many Russians feel toward America, and left the impression that this trend started during the Bush administration. But conveniently forgotten was that Russian views toward America were just as negative toward the end of President Clinton's time in office. Even recent poll numbers on Russian public opinion are similar those measured in 1999.
In the June 23, 1999, Washington Times article, Janine Wedel wrote:
The Clinton administration has succeeded where Soviet propaganda failed: The reputation of the United States in Russia is tarnished, and, despite Russia's help in resolving the Kosovo crisis, relations between Russia and the United States are far from the friendly partnership envisioned at the end of the Cold War.
Angered by NATO's bombing in Serbia, many Russians who steadfastly admired the United States during and after the Cold War now spurn America. In a recent nationwide public opinion poll, nearly half of the respondents said their view of America was "mainly bad" or "very bad."
She later tied in Russian discontent over America's economic aid to the country:
The chief Russian beneficiary of U.S. economic aid was a small clique of political and financial power brokers known in Russia as the "Chubais Clan," named after its leader Anatoly Chubais, the main architect of economic programs since 1992. Although consistently among the most hated figures in Russia, Mr. Chubais and his "young reformers" were promoted by Mr. Summers as the chief brokers with the West.
In the April 12, 1999, New York Times, Michael Wines wrote:
The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia may or may not free the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, but a thousand miles away, it has already had a profoundly liberating effect. After eight long-suffering years, it is once again acceptable -- even de rigueur -- for Russians to dislike Americans.
Enough Russians have embraced animosity, and with such sudden fervor, that some experts here say it threatens to become the guiding force in a relationship with little else going for it.Anti-Americanism is not universal -- not by a long shot -- but in this cosmopolitan capital, the shift in public sentiment in the three weeks since the NATO bombing began has been both swift and palpable. It is not rare for Americans to be denounced or harassed on the street.
He soon cited a poll similar to the results of 2009:
In a nationwide survey of 1,600 Russians, the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Studies concluded that only 39 percent of respondents felt positive about the United States in March, compared with 67 percent just three months earlier. The share of Russians who said their view of America was "mainly bad" or "very bad" more than doubled, from 23 percent to 49 percent.
But on Monday's World News, ABC anchor Charles Gibson and correspondent Clarissa Ward seemed to place the blame on President Bush. Gibson referred to "nearly a decade" of bad relations: "After nearly a decade of tense relations with the U.S., Russians remain wary, even of a President who promises change."
Ward then referred to "eight years" of decline in U.S.-Russian relations, but cited nearly identical poll numbers as existed in 1999:
CLARISSA WARD: In the last eight years, profound disagreements over issues such as the war in Iraq, the invasion of Georgia, and NATO expansion have sunk U.S.-Russian relations to post-Cold War lows. "I'm against America's imperial ambitions," this man says. In a recent poll, 46 percent of Russians said they had a mainly negative opinion of the U.S. That's up from just seven percent in 1990.
#From the June 23, 1999, Washington Times article, "Baiting the Bear," by Janine R. Wedel:
The Clinton administration has succeeded where Soviet propaganda failed: The reputation of the United States in Russia is tarnished, and, despite Russia's help in resolving the Kosovo crisis, relations between Russia and the United States are far from the friendly partnership envisioned at the end of the Cold War.
Angered by NATO's bombing in Serbia, many Russians who steadfastly admired the United States during and after the Cold War now spurn America. In a recent nationwide public opinion poll, nearly half of the respondents said their view of America was "mainly bad" or "very bad." Although NATO bombing was the immediate detonator of the anti-American explosion, the artillery has long been primed. Anger has accumulated over economic "reforms," many of them urged, designed and funded by the U.S. government. The reforms have left many Russians worse off than before the breakup of the Soviet Union and many blame Western aid and advice, according to a U.S. Information Agency survey. Many Russians now believe that the United States deliberately set out to destroy their economy.
Unfortunately, U.S. policy makers are a long way from coming to terms with this shameful record. Lawrence Summers, who has been nominated to replace Robert Rubin as treasury secretary and is up for Senate confirmation this week, shares responsibility for the Russian fiasco. As a key architect of the administration's economic policy toward Russia with pivotal influence over U.S. economic aid and the International Monetary Fund, Mr. Summers served the agendas of a closed circle of people. The administration gave virtual control over hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. and Western taxpayers dollars to a small group of self-interested insiders, to the detriment of the legal and regulatory backbone of a market economy which supports property rights, the sanctity of contracts, and the rule of law.
The chief Russian beneficiary of U.S. economic aid was a small clique of political and financial power brokers known in Russia as the "Chubais Clan," named after its leader Anatoly Chubais, the main architect of economic programs since 1992. Although consistently among the most hated figures in Russia, Mr. Chubais and his "young reformers" were promoted by Mr. Summers as the chief brokers with the West.
The "dream team," as Mr. Summers called it, presided over the economic "reforms," including privatization - which was more about wealth confiscation than wealth creation - and helped to create a system of tycoon capitalism run for the benefit of a half dozen corrupt oligarchs. The result is that many Russians have come to associate "economic reform" and "capitalism" with looting, capital flight and dubious activities in which handful of people benefit.
The Chubais Clan had substantial help from Mr. Summers' colleagues from his Harvard days. Mr. Summers backed an arrangement whereby the Harvard Institute for International Development was given, as the U.S. General Accounting Office determined in 1996, "substantial control of the U.S. assistance program." With "foreign policy considerations" as the justification for this highly unusual arrangement, the Harvard Institute was handed awards without appreciable oversight. Mr. Summers' co-author and protege, Harvard economist Andrei Shleifer, directed the Institute's Russia project.
The Chubais-Harvard partnership not only failed to achieve viable economic reform but also served to undermine democratic and state institutions. With U.S. support, the partnership set up and ran a network of aid-funded "private" organizations. The "private" Russian Privatization Center negotiated loans with the IMF on behalf of the Russian state, bypassed the Duma, the elected Russian parliament and served as the Chubais Clan's political and financial resource. The Center attracted some $4 billion in Western aid, according to its CEO, which the Chamber of Accounts, Russia's rough equivalent of the GAO, said "was not spent as designated." And, while private individuals were reaping the benefits of loans that went missing, it is the Russian people who are expected to repay them.
Harvard, too, had its troubles. In 1996, the GAO found that U.S. oversight over Harvard was "lax," and, following allegations in 1997 that Mr. Shleifer and the other Harvard principals used their positions and inside knowledge as advisers to profit from investments in Russia, the U.S. government cancelled the last $14 million earmarked for Harvard. Mr. Shleifer and others are now under criminal and or civil investigation by the Justice Department.
As Russia roiled in economic ruin last July, Mr. Summers entertained Mr. Chubais, who had been appointed a month earlier to be Boris Yeltsin's envoy in charge of relations with the IMF, in his home for brunch - where officials worked out the details of an emergency IMF loan. The meeting was crucial in obtaining the release of the funds, according to a New York Times report. After the crash just a month later, Mr. Chubais congratulated himself for having "conned" from the IMF its last $4.8 billion loan. The money was found to have disappeared shortly thereafter.
What should be done now? Our challenge is to foster friendship with the Russian people after having facilitated bad policies and anti-American sentiment. We should act before the international crisis worsens. It is time to face up to the U.S. role in the economic meltdown and in fostering Russian ill-will. We must stop our policy of support-at-all-costs for Mr. Yeltsin and the Chubais Clan, with whom Mr. Summers and other key U.S. officials remain tight.
In Washington several weeks ago, Mr. Chubais, now chairman of the electricity monopoly United Energy Systems, made the rounds with U.S. officials. These included Mr. Summers, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Undersecretary Strobe Talbott and National Security Adviser Sandy Berger -as well as top officials from the IMF and the World Bank. It is clear that Mr. Chubais remains a favored son; his comeback in the new Russian government may well be promoted in Washington.
But this would be seen in conspiratorial terms in Russia and anti-American sentiment may be one of the very few sentiments capable of unifying Russia's fragmented political clans. If we are finally to promote policies that build goodwill over the long haul, we must cease to select specific groups or individuals as the recipients of a blank check.
Although a reversal of policy will require a long and resolute process of diplomacy, administration officials can take steps, by, for example, meeting with members of the Duma and a diversity of Russian elites. As a demonstration of our commitment to the rule of law, the United States should launch a high-level drive to recover monies that have ended up in private, unregulated bank accounts outside of Russia. This would show concern for the Russian people, who otherwise would be held responsible for paying back loans from which they did not benefit.
#From the April 12, 1999, New York Times article, "Crisis in the Balkans: The Russians; Hostility to U.S. Is Now Popular With Russians," by Michael Wines:
The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia may or may not free the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, but a thousand miles away, it has already had a profoundly liberating effect. After eight long-suffering years, it is once again acceptable -- even de rigueur -- for Russians to dislike Americans.
Enough Russians have embraced animosity, and with such sudden fervor, that some experts here say it threatens to become the guiding force in a relationship with little else going for it.
Anti-Americanism is not universal -- not by a long shot -- but in this cosmopolitan capital, the shift in public sentiment in the three weeks since the NATO bombing began has been both swift and palpable. It is not rare for Americans to be denounced or harassed on the street.
The mainstream Moscow newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda captured the prickly nature of popular feeling this week in a full-page article bearing the eye-catching headline: "This is the way we shoot down Americans! Yugoslav pilots share their first combat experience."
In a nationwide survey of 1,600 Russians, the All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Studies concluded that only 39 percent of respondents felt positive about the United States in March, compared with 67 percent just three months earlier. The share of Russians who said their view of America was "mainly bad" or "very bad" more than doubled, from 23 percent to 49 percent.
Russia's Communist-trained political class has always held the United States in low regard, said Andre Piontovsky, a well-known political expert here. But never -- until now -- has the contempt made the leap to large segments of the general public.
"Anti-Americanism really may be becoming the Russian national idea that we have been searching for," he said.
Many would dispute that. Like much of the world, Russia seems to carry on a love-hate relationship with the United States, envying its wealth and power while soaking up its culture and exports. But there is no doubt that anti-American feelings are now driving Russian policy, both foreign and domestic.
The welling up of anti-Americanism has put one of the United States' more reliable Russian allies, President Boris N. Yeltsin, in an exquisite political vise. He surely faces another economic disaster if he cannot win another multi-billion-dollar loan this spring from the Western-run International Monetary Fund. But he also faces possible impeachment this week by the Communist-controlled Parliament, which has stationed itself at the head of the anti-American charge.
And so Mr. Yeltsin has juggled the two sides all month, suggesting to the Communists last week that he favors political union with Yugoslavia while playing down the notion elsewhere -- and rumbling publicly about aiming nuclear missiles at Washington while privately considering nothing of the kind.
Mr. Yeltsin's Government has sounded so tough toward Washington, joked Valentin V. Chikin, editor of the reliably Communist newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya, that both the Defense and Foreign Ministers sounded like clones of Communist Party leaders in the national legislature.
Russia's anti-American angst over Yugoslavia may understandably puzzle Americans. Russians and Serbs share an Eastern Orthodox tradition, but Yugoslavia, after all, has no border with Russia and was not even a reliably pro-Moscow ally during the days of Soviet empire. Its President, Slobodan Milosevic, is hardly the sort of leader most governments would willingly endorse.
But Russians view the bombing of Yugoslavia through a different and darker lens. To most of them, the NATO bombing campaign is the latest and most flagrant instance in which the United States has rubbed Moscow's nose in its new second-tier status.
Rightly or not, Russian illusions about democracy and the American character already have been shattered by Russia's disastrous introduction to capitalism, said Sergei M. Rogov, who directs the Institute for the Study of the U.S. and Canada here.
Many Russians were led to believe that the United States would spend billions of dollars, Marshall Plan-style, to ease Russia's transition from Communism to market capitalism, he said. When the money failed to arrive and the transition foundered, the Russian reaction was to feel betrayed.
"The outcome," he said, "created the perception that the United States was doing it on purpose -- trying to undermine Russia as an economic and political competitor."
American military policy has only reinforced the average Russian's suspicions, he said.
"Russians felt that we ended the cold war and started to behave nicely by dissolving the Warsaw Pact, withdrawing troops, cutting arms," he said. "And thus the very maintenance of NATO was seen as strange. But the enlargement of NATO, with NATO absorbing former Soviet clients -- that was interpreted as a symbol of Western mistrust toward Russia, and some even said hostile intentions."
NATO intervention in Yugoslavia, in addition to the American and British bombing of Iraq, has only galvanized Russian fears that the Soviet propagandists may have been right -- and that Americans are in fact bent on imposing their will on the world, by force if necessary.
The weight of such disillusionment might be more bearable were the United States' relationship with Russia strong. But Mr. Rogov said the two nations' relations are in deep crisis, with disagreements over everything from economics to military and strategic policies.
Vyachaslav Nikonov, who directs the Russian research institute Politica, agrees.
"I don't think it can influence the relationship between the two countries, because the relationship is nonexistent," he said. "Except for I.M.F. issues, I don't think there is an agenda."
The average Russian reacts more viscerally to events in Yugoslavia.
"It's the same as what Russia did when we wanted to have Chechnya," a beefy 39-year-old driver named Igor -- now unemployed -- said as he stood in Pushkin Square here on Friday. "Now Yugoslavia, next us; that's what I think."
"They never wanted to help us, not sincerely," he said. "Politicians are never sincere. They just say nice things. Watch what they do."
With that, he wheeled about and followed the throng into a Pushkin Square theater to catch the Moscow premiere of a new movie: the Hollywood science-fiction potboiler "Lost in Space."
