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Iraqi Documents Rebut the Senate Intelligence Report on WMD.
Pentagon/FMSO website for Iraq Pre-war documents http://70.168.46.200... ^
| September 18 2006 | jveritas

Posted on 09/18/2006 12:33:19 PM PDT by jveritas

"It was clear that there is another branch committee from
the Industrial Committee headed by Dr. Mahdi Shakr Ghali that currently
evaluates the researches that cannot be declared (researches with relation to the previous Prohibited Programs) through presenting the Specialized Staff that ask to evaluate its researches, to conclusion related to these researches. This is an important subject and it is dangerous in case this information is leaked one way or another.”
Mohamad Hussam Al Amin, Director of the Iraqi National Monitoring
Directorate, September 16 1998, pages 63 and 64 from captured Iraqi
document CMPC-2003-002284 .

The latest Senate
Intelligence Committee (SIC) report released on September 8 2006 was as
many expected very biased, inaccurate, and totally political and came
up with very wrong conclusions regarding Saddam regime WMD and
programs, as well as totally dismissive of Saddam relation with Al
Qaeda. The SIC report regarding WMD was heavily dependent on the Iraq
Survey Group (ISG) report which was released in September 2004.
Unfortunately, the ISG also came to the wrong conclusions that Iraq did
not have active WMD programs.

I will address the WMD portion
of the SIC report based on the captured Iraqi documents that deal with
this issue, and show how these documents do not agree with this report
wrong conclusions about Iraq WMD.

The Chemical Weapons (CW) Programs:

There are two very important documents which clearly indicate that Iraq
was working on activating the Chemical weapons programs. Document CMPC-2003-013956.pdf dated in the year 2000 and document ISGQ-2003-00044424.pdf dated
January 2002 contain memos that talk about finalized research and the
plans to locally produce Chemical Materials that can be used as
Precursors for Chemical Weapons and that are prohibited by the Iraq to
produce locally according to the UN sanctions. Some of the Chemical
Weapons Prohibited Precursors include DICYLOHEXYLDIACARBODIIMIDE which can be used as a Precursor to make VX NERVE GAS, SODIUM CYANIDE AND POTASSIUM CYANIDE can be used as a Precursor to make TABUN NERVE GAS.
These materials were allowed to be imported under strict UN regulation
because it can be used for other civilian industries and that Iraq
should have declared exactly the imported quantities of these materials
and where it is used and the balance in bi-yearly report to the UN. However
Iraq was absolutely prohibited from manufacturing it locally because it
will not be controlled by the UN and thus it can be used to produce
Chemical Weapons. It is clear from the documents above that Saddam
regime was researching and planning to produce these Chemical weapons
Precursors in clear violation of UN rules, and with no other intention
but to produce Chemical weapons despite that the Iraqi listed some of
these precursors under a supposed “pharmaceutical project”.

The Senate Intelligence Committee report did not address these very
important documents to show that Iraq was actively working on
rebuilding its WMD programs, and planning to produce the precursors to
make Chemical Weapons. In fact it would have been more useful for the
Iraqis to produce and store the precursors rather than the final
chemical weapon products because storing the CW in its final form can
deteriorate after a period of time where as the precursors can last for
much longer time, ready to be assembled into final CW when needed.

Two other important documents related to the Chemical Weapons programs are ISGQ-2004-00220151 and CMPC-2003-016083 . The first one dated in the year 2001 talks about the successful local
production of 50 Chemical Decontamination vehicles to be used the
Chemical Battalions of the Iraqi army with plans to build more and the second which is also dated 2001 talks about the local production of prohibited Nerve Gas detectors.
Although some may say that these are defensive actions rather than
offensive, the production of so many Chemical decontamination trailers
and prohibited Nerve gas detectors are not meant to be used solely for
defensive action in the Iraq of Saddam Hussein. These decontamination
trailers are necessary to escort the Iraqis if they were moving
chemical weapons from place to another because in case of a chemical
accident these decontamination vehicles must be used. In fact during
Colin Powell presentation to the UN on February 2003, he said that the
2002 satellite photos taken recently over Iraq showed presence of these
Chemical decontamination trailers which indicate movement of Chemical
weapons. Powell said “In May 2002, our satellites photographed the
unusual activity in this picture. Here we see cargo vehicles are again
at this transshipment point, and we can see that they are accompanied
by a decontamination vehicle associated with biological or chemical
weapons activity.” The Nerve Gas detectors were prohibited in Iraq by
the UN since the Iraqis can use them in an offensive action in case
they strike their enemies with Nerve Gas these detectors will be used
to warn the Iraqi soldiers if the wind blows back and brings some this
Nerve gas they used to attack their enemies.

Again the Senate
Intelligence Committee did not mention anything about the production of
these Chemical decontamination vehicles or Nerve Gas detectors. The
report failed to comprehend and address the obsession of Saddam regime
regarding the issue of Chemical Weapons. Saddam regime survived the
Iraq-Iran war because it used CW against the Iranians. Saddam regime
was totally paranoid and in the mind of Saddam it would had been
impossible for him to survive by counting on taking defensive measures
if it came to a Chemical Warfare against Iran, or possibly Israel.
Saddam regime strongly believed that having the ability to make
Chemical weapons was very crucial for the survival of his regime in
another future war against Iran because Saddam was always afraid that
Iranians can attack anytime if they sense the weakness of his regime or
if they realize that he did not possess Chemical Weapons anymore.

The Biological Weapons (BW):

The SIC report concluded that Iraq did not have Biological Weapons or
programs related to biological weapons. The center piece of the report
(BW) section was the “Mobile Laboratory Vehicles” that the previous
intelligence reports indicated it was for Biological weapons
production, but later on the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) examined two of
the captured mobile labs and concluded it was made most probably for
Hydrogen Production, the SIC report adopted the story of the ISG
regarding these mobile labs.

Document CMPC-2004-006626 dated November 11 2002 talks about a plan to develop MOBILE LABORATORIES.
The document is from a company called Ibn Rushd which is subsidiary of
the Iraqi Military Industrialization Commission (MIC) and one of the
companies suspected in developing Iraq Biological and Chemical
Programs. The ISG report said the mobile labs they captured were
manufactured by AL Kindi general company in 2002 not by Ibn Rushd
company. The list of instruments required to build Ibn Rushd mobile
labs does not indicate that it was used for Hydrogen production. Also
if these mobile labs were used to make Hydrogen, it would have been
mentioned in the document. The only document that mentions a “Hydrogen
Production System” is ISGQ-2004-00220151 in pages 82 and 83 of
this document. The document does not mention that this “Hydrogen
Production System” was not described as a “Vehicle” or as a “Mobile
Laboratory”. The document indicates that the production of this
“Hydrogen Production System” was in the year 1997 and it was produced
by a collaboration of few MIC companies, but the AL Kindi company was
nowhere mentioned as part of this project. Also it is important to note
that the original assessment of the military after the capture of the
mobile vehicles that it can be used for Biological Weapons production,
but it was the ISG who dismissed this original conclusion and adopted
the Hydrogen production vehicles theory.

Both the ISG and SIC
reports should have examined the Ibn Rushd mobile laboratories document
which contradicts the story of the “Hydrogen Production vehicles”.

The Iraqi Nuclear Program.

For sure Iraq did not produce any Nuclear Weapons but the SIC based on
the ISG report totally dismiss that Saddam was intending to build its
nuclear program. The SIC report when handling the Iraq nuclear issue
focuses on two issues that caused a lot of controversy and heated
argument in the past three years and still cause it until now. On his
state of the Union address President Bush mentioned that the US learned
from British intelligence that Iraq was seeking Yellow Cake Uranium
from Africa and he also said that Iraq was seeking high strength
Aluminum tubes, both an indication of Saddam regime intent to rebuild
its nuclear programs and activities.

Also in this case, the
SIC also heavily based its report on the ISG finding regarding the
Yellow Cake and the Aluminum tubes and concluded as the ISG that Saddam
regime did not intend to re-activate its nuclear program.

On
the high strength Aluminum tubes, the SIC and ISG reports concluded
that these tubes that were captured by the US in 2001 were used as
bodies for the 81 mm rockets and not to intended to be used in the
centrifuge system for Uranium enrichment. The ISG reported that the
very tight tolerances of these tubes were based on a decision made
after a technical committee meeting in late 2000 to enhance the
performance the 81 mm rockets. According to the ISG report Iraq used to
import 81 mm Aluminum tubes before 1991 from Italy but with looser
machining tolerances than the one they wanted to implement after the
September 2000 technical meeting. However some of the documents
contradict the ISG conclusion and analysis.

CMCP-2004-004404
shows a bid request from the Iraqi Military Industrial Commission (MIC)
dated November 1999 to import 50,000 of these 81 mm Aluminum tubes with
the same very tight tolerance that the ISG reported it was agreed upon
after the September 2000 meeting i.e. 10 months after the bid request.
Page 4 of the document shows the dimensions of the high strength
Aluminum tubes with the very tight tolerances and page 10 of the
documents shows that one of the bidding Iraqi firms complained that the
“tolerances are to strict to meet” and it is “exceeding the stipulation
of American standards”. Also the 1999 bid ask for 900 mm length tubes
where as the length of the 81 mm rocket was 862 mm, so if the tubes
were made for 81 mm rockets why the 1999 bid did not specify 862 mm
length instead of 900 mm and save the agony and time consumption of
machining the length down from 900 mm to 862 mm.

Document ISGQ-2003-00000875
indicates that Iraq had local production of the 81 mm bodies in the
year 2002 with looser machining tolerances than the ones in the 1999
bid and the September 2000 technical meeting. It is clear that the
Iraqis thought in 2002 that the looser machining dimensions are OK to
be used for the bodies of the 81 mm rockets and the question is why
they requested much stricter machining tolerance in the 1999 bid to
import these tubes. Even the ISG had difficult time explaining why in
2002 the Iraqi accepted looser tolerances to make the Aluminum tubes
bodies for the 81 mm rockets.

Document ISGQ-2003-00001019
contains a secret and personal letter dated December 2000 addressed by
the Director of Al Rashid company an MIC firm to the head of MIC
telling him about the production of the bodies for the 81 mm rockets.
This letter indicates that the Iraqi were producing the 81 mm rockets
as early as the year 2000 so their attempt to import Aluminum tubes for
81 mm rockets does not make sense.

In regards to the Yellow
Cake story the ISG uncovered one Iraqi document which showed that an
Iraqi was approached by a person from Africa in 2001 who offered his
service in providing Iraq with Uranium from the Africa but the Iraqis
told the African man that because to the UN sanctions Iraq cannot
accept his offer.

Document ISGQ-2003-00000813.pdf shows that the Iraqi were working on producing TANTALUM COATED GRAPHITE
as part of research activities for the year 2002. The Graphite coated
Tantalum to create a highly corrosion resistant surface for graphite.
Tantalum coated Graphite was totally prohibited for use in Iraq
according to the UN since it falls under the prohibited nuclear
activities and since one of the few applications of this Tantalum
coated Graphite is to be used with the highly