Iraqi Documents Rebut the Senate Intelligence Report on WMD.
Iraqi Documents Rebut the Senate Intelligence Report on WMD.
Pentagon/FMSO website for Iraq Pre-war documents http://126.96.36.199/ ^ | September 18 2006 | jveritas
Posted on 09/18/2006 12:33:19 PM PDT by jveritas
"It was clear that there is another branch committee from the Industrial Committee headed by Dr. Mahdi Shakr Ghali that currently evaluates the researches that cannot be declared (researches with relation to the previous Prohibited Programs) through presenting the Specialized Staff that ask to evaluate its researches, to conclusion related to these researches. This is an important subject and it is dangerous in case this information is leaked one way or another.” Mohamad Hussam Al Amin, Director of the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate, September 16 1998, pages 63 and 64 from captured Iraqi document CMPC-2003-002284 .
The latest Senate Intelligence Committee (SIC) report released on September 8 2006 was as many expected very biased, inaccurate, and totally political and came up with very wrong conclusions regarding Saddam regime WMD and programs, as well as totally dismissive of Saddam relation with Al Qaeda. The SIC report regarding WMD was heavily dependent on the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) report which was released in September 2004. Unfortunately, the ISG also came to the wrong conclusions that Iraq did not have active WMD programs.
I will address the WMD portion of the SIC report based on the captured Iraqi documents that deal with this issue, and show how these documents do not agree with this report wrong conclusions about Iraq WMD.
The Chemical Weapons (CW) Programs:
There are two very important documents which clearly indicate that Iraq was working on activating the Chemical weapons programs. Document CMPC-2003-013956.pdf dated in the year 2000 and document ISGQ-2003-00044424.pdf dated January 2002 contain memos that talk about finalized research and the plans to locally produce Chemical Materials that can be used as Precursors for Chemical Weapons and that are prohibited by the Iraq to produce locally according to the UN sanctions. Some of the Chemical Weapons Prohibited Precursors include DICYLOHEXYLDIACARBODIIMIDE which can be used as a Precursor to make VX NERVE GAS, SODIUM CYANIDE AND POTASSIUM CYANIDE can be used as a Precursor to make TABUN NERVE GAS. These materials were allowed to be imported under strict UN regulation because it can be used for other civilian industries and that Iraq should have declared exactly the imported quantities of these materials and where it is used and the balance in bi-yearly report to the UN. However Iraq was absolutely prohibited from manufacturing it locally because it will not be controlled by the UN and thus it can be used to produce Chemical Weapons. It is clear from the documents above that Saddam regime was researching and planning to produce these Chemical weapons Precursors in clear violation of UN rules, and with no other intention but to produce Chemical weapons despite that the Iraqi listed some of these precursors under a supposed “pharmaceutical project”.
The Senate Intelligence Committee report did not address these very important documents to show that Iraq was actively working on rebuilding its WMD programs, and planning to produce the precursors to make Chemical Weapons. In fact it would have been more useful for the Iraqis to produce and store the precursors rather than the final chemical weapon products because storing the CW in its final form can deteriorate after a period of time where as the precursors can last for much longer time, ready to be assembled into final CW when needed.
Two other important documents related to the Chemical Weapons programs are ISGQ-2004-00220151 and CMPC-2003-016083 . The first one dated in the year 2001 talks about the successful local production of 50 Chemical Decontamination vehicles to be used the Chemical Battalions of the Iraqi army with plans to build more and the second which is also dated 2001 talks about the local production of prohibited Nerve Gas detectors. Although some may say that these are defensive actions rather than offensive, the production of so many Chemical decontamination trailers and prohibited Nerve gas detectors are not meant to be used solely for defensive action in the Iraq of Saddam Hussein. These decontamination trailers are necessary to escort the Iraqis if they were moving chemical weapons from place to another because in case of a chemical accident these decontamination vehicles must be used. In fact during Colin Powell presentation to the UN on February 2003, he said that the 2002 satellite photos taken recently over Iraq showed presence of these Chemical decontamination trailers which indicate movement of Chemical weapons. Powell said “In May 2002, our satellites photographed the unusual activity in this picture. Here we see cargo vehicles are again at this transshipment point, and we can see that they are accompanied by a decontamination vehicle associated with biological or chemical weapons activity.” The Nerve Gas detectors were prohibited in Iraq by the UN since the Iraqis can use them in an offensive action in case they strike their enemies with Nerve Gas these detectors will be used to warn the Iraqi soldiers if the wind blows back and brings some this Nerve gas they used to attack their enemies.
Again the Senate Intelligence Committee did not mention anything about the production of these Chemical decontamination vehicles or Nerve Gas detectors. The report failed to comprehend and address the obsession of Saddam regime regarding the issue of Chemical Weapons. Saddam regime survived the Iraq-Iran war because it used CW against the Iranians. Saddam regime was totally paranoid and in the mind of Saddam it would had been impossible for him to survive by counting on taking defensive measures if it came to a Chemical Warfare against Iran, or possibly Israel. Saddam regime strongly believed that having the ability to make Chemical weapons was very crucial for the survival of his regime in another future war against Iran because Saddam was always afraid that Iranians can attack anytime if they sense the weakness of his regime or if they realize that he did not possess Chemical Weapons anymore.
The Biological Weapons (BW):
The SIC report concluded that Iraq did not have Biological Weapons or programs related to biological weapons. The center piece of the report (BW) section was the “Mobile Laboratory Vehicles” that the previous intelligence reports indicated it was for Biological weapons production, but later on the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) examined two of the captured mobile labs and concluded it was made most probably for Hydrogen Production, the SIC report adopted the story of the ISG regarding these mobile labs.
Document CMPC-2004-006626 dated November 11 2002 talks about a plan to develop MOBILE LABORATORIES. The document is from a company called Ibn Rushd which is subsidiary of the Iraqi Military Industrialization Commission (MIC) and one of the companies suspected in developing Iraq Biological and Chemical Programs. The ISG report said the mobile labs they captured were manufactured by AL Kindi general company in 2002 not by Ibn Rushd company. The list of instruments required to build Ibn Rushd mobile labs does not indicate that it was used for Hydrogen production. Also if these mobile labs were used to make Hydrogen, it would have been mentioned in the document. The only document that mentions a “Hydrogen Production System” is ISGQ-2004-00220151 in pages 82 and 83 of this document. The document does not mention that this “Hydrogen Production System” was not described as a “Vehicle” or as a “Mobile Laboratory”. The document indicates that the production of this “Hydrogen Production System” was in the year 1997 and it was produced by a collaboration of few MIC companies, but the AL Kindi company was nowhere mentioned as part of this project. Also it is important to note that the original assessment of the military after the capture of the mobile vehicles that it can be used for Biological Weapons production, but it was the ISG who dismissed this original conclusion and adopted the Hydrogen production vehicles theory.
Both the ISG and SIC reports should have examined the Ibn Rushd mobile laboratories document which contradicts the story of the “Hydrogen Production vehicles”.
The Iraqi Nuclear Program.
For sure Iraq did not produce any Nuclear Weapons but the SIC based on the ISG report totally dismiss that Saddam was intending to build its nuclear program. The SIC report when handling the Iraq nuclear issue focuses on two issues that caused a lot of controversy and heated argument in the past three years and still cause it until now. On his state of the Union address President Bush mentioned that the US learned from British intelligence that Iraq was seeking Yellow Cake Uranium from Africa and he also said that Iraq was seeking high strength Aluminum tubes, both an indication of Saddam regime intent to rebuild its nuclear programs and activities.
Also in this case, the SIC also heavily based its report on the ISG finding regarding the Yellow Cake and the Aluminum tubes and concluded as the ISG that Saddam regime did not intend to re-activate its nuclear program.
On the high strength Aluminum tubes, the SIC and ISG reports concluded that these tubes that were captured by the US in 2001 were used as bodies for the 81 mm rockets and not to intended to be used in the centrifuge system for Uranium enrichment. The ISG reported that the very tight tolerances of these tubes were based on a decision made after a technical committee meeting in late 2000 to enhance the performance the 81 mm rockets. According to the ISG report Iraq used to import 81 mm Aluminum tubes before 1991 from Italy but with looser machining tolerances than the one they wanted to implement after the September 2000 technical meeting. However some of the documents contradict the ISG conclusion and analysis.
CMCP-2004-004404 shows a bid request from the Iraqi Military Industrial Commission (MIC) dated November 1999 to import 50,000 of these 81 mm Aluminum tubes with the same very tight tolerance that the ISG reported it was agreed upon after the September 2000 meeting i.e. 10 months after the bid request. Page 4 of the document shows the dimensions of the high strength Aluminum tubes with the very tight tolerances and page 10 of the documents shows that one of the bidding Iraqi firms complained that the “tolerances are to strict to meet” and it is “exceeding the stipulation of American standards”. Also the 1999 bid ask for 900 mm length tubes where as the length of the 81 mm rocket was 862 mm, so if the tubes were made for 81 mm rockets why the 1999 bid did not specify 862 mm length instead of 900 mm and save the agony and time consumption of machining the length down from 900 mm to 862 mm.
Document ISGQ-2003-00000875 indicates that Iraq had local production of the 81 mm bodies in the year 2002 with looser machining tolerances than the ones in the 1999 bid and the September 2000 technical meeting. It is clear that the Iraqis thought in 2002 that the looser machining dimensions are OK to be used for the bodies of the 81 mm rockets and the question is why they requested much stricter machining tolerance in the 1999 bid to import these tubes. Even the ISG had difficult time explaining why in 2002 the Iraqi accepted looser tolerances to make the Aluminum tubes bodies for the 81 mm rockets.
Document ISGQ-2003-00001019 contains a secret and personal letter dated December 2000 addressed by the Director of Al Rashid company an MIC firm to the head of MIC telling him about the production of the bodies for the 81 mm rockets. This letter indicates that the Iraqi were producing the 81 mm rockets as early as the year 2000 so their attempt to import Aluminum tubes for 81 mm rockets does not make sense.
In regards to the Yellow Cake story the ISG uncovered one Iraqi document which showed that an Iraqi was approached by a person from Africa in 2001 who offered his service in providing Iraq with Uranium from the Africa but the Iraqis told the African man that because to the UN sanctions Iraq cannot accept his offer.Document ISGQ-2003-00000813.pdf shows that the Iraqi were working on producing TANTALUM COATED GRAPHITE as part of research activities for the year 2002. The Graphite coated Tantalum to create a highly corrosion resistant surface for graphite. Tantalum coated Graphite was totally prohibited for use in Iraq according to the UN since it falls under the prohibited nuclear activities and since one of the few applications of this Tantalum coated Graphite is to be used with the highly