Between the cover-up by the Clinton Administration, and the silence of the press, what other conclusion could you come to, Jimbo?  Every day, more and more, I feel like a character from an episode of "The Twilight Zone", where the press covers up for and cheers for the liars and yet we still somehow know that the truth is being kept from us.  Scary.

I want some answers here form the Justice Dept...why in God's name would they just decide to look the other way....orders from who? Is the Justice Dept so overwhelmed with Clintoon left-overs that all wrong-doers get away with every single thing?

Every time I hear something like this it makes me wonder....Just exactly who were the names in those 1000 illegally obtained FBI files? 

  Ignorance is bliss. It's easier to repeat a mindless slogan than to do some actual research.

Oh wow ... a drama-documentary uses fictionalized scenes to convey the essential truth of what happened.

Why, one might think you've never ever seen a docu-drama before.

Oh, I get it, you think that the docu-drama The Gathering Storm, starring Albert Finney as Sir Winston Churcill, was a verbatim account of exactly what the great man said and did between 1930 and 1940?

All laid out as if there had been 10 years of footage to check. Who knows, maybe you really are that dim.

In the meantime try reading page 140 of the 9/11 Commission Report.

Better still, I'll quote it. It's very interesting as it details one of the many occasions Clinton failed to get bin Laden when he had the chance. You know, like the scene that was deleted WAS MEANT TO convey.

PAGE 140. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT

Kandahar, May 1999
It was in Kandahar that perhaps the last, and most likely the best, opportunity arose for targeting Bin Ladin with cruise missiles before 9/11.

In May 1999, CIA assets in Afghanistan reported on Bin Ladin’s location in and around Kandahar over the course of five days and nights. The reporting was very detailed and came from several sources. If this intelligence was not “actionable,” working-level officials said at the time and today, it was hard for them to imagine how any intelligence on Bin Ladin in Afghanistan would meet the standard. Communications were good, and the cruise missiles were ready.“This was in our strike zone,” a senior military officer said. “It was a fat pitch, a home run.”

He expected the missiles to fly.When the decision came back that they should stand down, not shoot, the officer said,“we all just slumped.” He told us he knew of no one at the Pentagon or the CIA who thought it was a bad gamble. Bin Ladin “should have been a dead man” that night, he said.173 Working-level CIA officials agreed. While there was a conflicting intelligence report about Bin Ladin’s whereabouts, the experts discounted it.

At the time, CIA working-level officials were told by their managers that the strikes were not ordered because the military doubted the intelligence and worried about collateral damage. Replying to a frustrated colleague in the field, the Bin Ladin unit chief wrote:“having a chance to get [Bin Ladin] three times in 36 hours and foregoing the chance each time has made me a bit angry. . . . [T]he DCI finds himself alone at the table, with the other princip[als] basically saying ‘we’ll go along with your decision Mr.Director,’ and implicitly saying that the Agency will hang alone if the attack doesn’t get Bin Ladin.”

But the military officer quoted earlier recalled that the Pentagon had been willing to act. He told us that Clarke informed him and others that Tenet assessed the chance of the intelligence being accurate as 50–50. This officer believed that Tenet’s assessment was the key to the decision.175 Tenet told us he does not remember any details about this episode, except that the intelligence came from a single uncorroborated source and that there was a risk of collateral damage.

The story is further complicated by Tenet’s absence from the critical principals meeting on this strike (he was apparently out of town); his deputy, John Gordon, was representing the CIA. Gordon recalled having presented the intelligence in a positive light, with appropriate caveats, but stating that this intelligence was about as good as it could get.176 Berger remembered only that in all such cases, the call had been Tenet’s.

Berger felt sure that Tenet was eager to get Bin Ladin. In his view,Tenet did his job responsibly.“George would call and say,‘We just don’t have it,’” Berger said.

The decision not to strike in May 1999 may now seem hard to understand.

A "progressive" = a liberal = a socialist = a commie in drag =
laughably wrong about life, the universe and everything.