The Soviets were South Yemen’s major partner, but South Yemen does not exist anymore. The Soviets built the Aswan High Dam in Egypt, but a few years later the opportunistic president Sadat terminated his country’s relations with the USSR, as Henry Kissinger had offered him a simulacrum of victory in 1973.

The Soviet – Syrian relationship reflected for decades a typical lack of orientation, and a wide set of hesitations, ups and downs, and incomprehension. In Iraq, the Soviets imitated the West, and the coarse, barbaric and extremist pseudo-princes and bogus-kings, and back in the 80s, supported Saddam Hussein against Iran; this did not help however the post-Soviet Russians enter Baghdad before the Americans.

In Somalia, Russia left the worst memories due to its shift of policy and favoritism of the colonial relic of Abyssinia, fallaciously re-baptized Ethiopia. In Algeria, despite several decades of semi-asserted sympathy, never did the Soviet/Russian – Algerian relations reach the level of intimacy and intrigue of the French - colonial and postcolonial - involvement in the vast, Berberic, Khammitic country of the Atlas.

Worse than anywhere else, the Russians are most hated by the enormous Kushitic Ethiopian majority of the inhabitants of Abyssinia, because of the Soviet support of, and alliance with, the racist and barbaric tribes of the Amharas and the Tigrays, Abyssinian Semitic populations that form the minority of the appallingly tyrannical and backward realm.

In Iran, the Russians tried to approach the local Kurds, and they were the first to publish ‘Kurdological’ research, already before the October Revolution; however, Vladimir Fedorovich Minorsky, despite many linguistically and historically pertinent conclusions, failed to provide his imperial masters with a convincing suggestion of plausibly successful Russian involvement in the ‘Kurdish’ affairs, manipulation (and alliance with some) of the various peoples in the area, and use of his study’s focus for imperialist expansion. After a quarter century of glacial Soviet – Persian Imperial relationship, the Soviets thought opportune to offer some support to the ephemeral Mahabad Republic of Kurdistan in the aftermath of WW II; they viewed it as a means of opposing English prevalence in the nominally independent Iran. The relationship underwent several phases of enmity, Soviet – Imperial, Soviet – Theocratic Republican, Post Soviet Autocratic – Theocratic Republican. Only recently, Russia and Iran became partners in an Anti-Western adventure.

Despite the incredibly high number of wars and casualties, and regardless of the depth of the Christian Orthodox – Islamic Sunni religious conflict, the burden of the Russian – Ottoman relationship was not heavy on the new states launched by Lenin and Ataturk. The first trip abroad, effectuated by the first Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, brought Chicherin to Ankara. The gravity of the Eastern Roman imperial claim made by both, the tsars and the sultans, seemed then to have ended. Following three decades of good neighborhood relations, the Soviet Union and Turkey, in the early 50s, found themselves on opposite camps; this situation lasted for no less than four decades, and terminated with the collapse of the Soviet block, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The Ottoman/Turkish – Russian/Soviet relationship underwent many different stages. For no less than 33 consecutive years, Suleyman the Magnificent and Ivan the Terrible reigned in parallel (1533 – 1566); at those days, Russia was truly minuscule if compared with the Ottoman Empire that spanned from Algeria to Oman and from Austria to Somalia.

The reverse situation was produced in the aftermath of WW II; in fact, defeated in WW I, Russia was not decomposed in the Procrustean way the Ottoman Empire was. The subject was never studied comparatively; yet, it would help better illuminate dark pages of Modern History. Victorious the Germans and the Turks did not demand of the Russians in the Treaty of Brest Litovsk (3/3/1918 – nullified by the Treaty of Rapallo, April 1922) as much as the English and the French imposed on the Turks through the Treaty of Sevres (10 August 1920 – never ratified by the Sultan and rejected by Kemal Ataturk).

The Turkish – Russian relationship entered de facto a new phase with the declared War against Islamic Terrorism, which brought about the termination of the uni-polar international system (involving American supremacy), the rise of Russia as an important power in a multi-polar international system, and a politically unstable situation in vast parts of the world, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, Palestine, Sudan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Chechnya, etc.

With the American leadership incessantly promoting double standards policies in various parts of the world, with Europe miserably plunged into interminable strives, and with the Middle East in turmoil due to colonial, postcolonial and American involvements, today Turkey is midway between Russia and America. Will Russia be able to exploit this favorable circumstance?

What does all this tell us?

Russia in the Middle East – An evaluation

If we conceive the entire area of the Middle East as spanning throughout the Asiatic nucleus in the South of the Black Sea and the Caucasus, the Iranian periphery in the East, and the Northeastern African coastal countries from Gibraltar to the Horn of Africa, we have to conclude about the Russian / Soviet presence in the area as follows.

In the wider region of the Middle East, the Russian foreign policy has been characterized by the following traits:
- Inconsistency
- Instability
- Ephemeral gains and enduring losses
- Lack of general vision
- Lack of basic approach and pilot – concept
- Inability to transform early stage state relationships to endurable alliances
- Incapability to identify long term allies among the local peoples and minority groups, and launch bridges to them
- Incapacity to diffuse Russian or Christian Orthodox culture
- Impossibility to become a major political attraction for local states and peoples, ethno-linguistic and religious groups
- Total indifference for genuine local development (within the context of a relationship, there must always be a win-win situation)

What possible reasons are behind the Russian Middle Eastern failure?

For a country like Russia, with leading academia and famous historians, linguistics, the political failure in the Middle East becomes even stranger a phenomenon to interpret. Before and after the rise of Soviet Union, and down to our days, the Russian universities have been acknowledged for their leading scholars in all Middle East – related Humanities, all branches of Orientalism, African Studies, History of Religions and Islamology, Sociology and Social Anthropology, Ethnography, and Linguistics.

There cannot be any doubt about the information gathered, the knowledge accumulated, and the scientific methodology employed in the Russian universities, research centers, academia, and diplomatic – military schools. What went wrong then?

We can identify the reasons of the Russian failure as evolving around the following main axes:

1. Erroneous contextualization of a realistic Russian expansion in the Middle East

2. Lack of accurate interpretation of historical events

3. Lack of conceptualization of cultural and political data

Erroneous contextualization of a realistic Russian expansion in the Middle East

The type of expansion Russia became historically acquainted with is great scale land expansion; Russia never experienced the typical overseas adventures of the great colonial times of modern times, Spain, Portugal, France, Holland, England, and to lesser extent Italy, Germany and Belgium.

The Russian expansionism is the very traditional, landmass imperial expansion, as we know it throughout History thanks to Sumerian, Babylonian, and Hittite kings, Egyptian Pharaohs, Assyrian Emperors, Persian Shahs, Alexander and his Epigonoi (Successors), the Roman Imperatores, the Eastern Roman Basileis, the Asiatic conquerors, and the Islamic Caliphs.

One should put it otherwise; in fact, the Russian expansionism was the only recent landmass imperial expansion that proved to be successful and durable. Over the past 500 years, few similar efforts were similarly durable. The Ottoman expansion in Africa lasted between 300 and 400 years. But the Persian invasion of Northern India carried out by Nader Shah was an ephemeral phenomenon. Napoleon and Hitler attempted ill-fated invasions of vast parts of Europe, but their efforts met early failure and negative appreciation. We don’t count the Japanese invasion of China here, as it is clearly an overseas adventure (for the Japanese islanders). All the rest was either temporary or minor.

However, the Russian landmass imperial expansion was mainly an invasion of vast, mainly uninhabited areas in Asia; absolutely European of origin and vocation, the Russians expanded beyond the Urals in Asia only in the 17th century. One has to bear in mind that the Russian expansion to the East did not involve at all the vast territories of Central Asia, an exclusively Islamic area that remained independent from the Russian Empire until the middle of the 19th century. Russia, as northern country, expanded to the East in the northernmost confines of Asia (Siberia), and only in later periods (mainly the 1860s) the Russian expansionism was directed towards the South (Central Asia, and Caucasus).

So, the nature of the Russian expansionism was mainly invasion of mostly uninhabited lands where the scarce indigenous populations had never developed great states and sophisticated cultural and political structures.

However, invading and annexing undeveloped societies is a completely different affair than subjugating peoples and nations where great states and sophisticated cultures had been developed. The latter colonial model involves very different approaches, attitudes, and policies. Invading Siberia is not the same with occupying India (England), subjugating Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Cambodia (France) or subduing Somalia and Abyssinia (Italy). In earlier periods of European colonialism and overseas adventures, we note already the two types of foreign land invasion. Spain met fierce resistance in Mexico and Peru, whereas the Portuguese took control of the vast territory of today’s Brazil far more easily.

Having become acquainted with a completely different type of expansion, the Russians had it difficult to generate a different approach in the case of their gradual advance in Central Asia and Caucasus. This provoked a massive exodus of local populations, who fled from Samarqand, Bukhara, Khiva and other parts of central Asia to Iran, Ottoman Empire, Afghanistan, and colonized India.

In this way, the Russians never developed the diplomatic and cultural tools the French and the English employed in the case of numerous colonies, India, Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon, Abyssinia, etc. For the Russians, expansion meant always land annexation, and totalitarian rule; they were able to apply this policy in the case of Central Asia and parts of the Transcaucasia they detached from either the Ottoman Empire or Iran. However, this approach jeopardized the Russian approach to the Middle East.

The Russians viewed their expansion to parts of the Ottoman Empire as conflict of claims to the Eastern Roman Political, Cultural and Religious Heritage. This, historically viewed, was true; however, it did not lead to correct contextualization. In fact, for the 19th century Russians, an expansion to the detriment of the Ottoman Empire and Iran would be just another adjacent landmass annexation, not a political - cultural challenge. It would offer them some harbours in the Southern Seas, which contrarily to what happens in the North, would be permanently functional – not only in the summer.

Failing to understand the correct context, the real cultural, linguistic, religious and political environment into which they were trying to infiltrate, the Russians never managed to provide themselves with the correct tools that would ensure durable presence.

Their concept was simplistic: "if we invade Van, we can expand to Mosul; if we annex Mosul, we can expand up to Haleb; if Mosul and Haleb belong to Russia, we will be able to reach Damascus and Jerusalem". The Russian concept of linear geographical expansion was simply irrelevant within the Middle Eastern concept.

A strategic alliance between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, as late as 1905, to the detriment of Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia, could be a deal that would allow 100000 Russians to get gradually established in Jerusalem and Palestine (with port facilities in Jaffa – to protect the Ottomans against the English who controlled Egypt). Supporting the Ottoman presence in the Balkans and strengthening Russian presence in Palestine and Jerusalem would have changed the course of the World History. However, the Russian imperial diplomats did not even imagine a perspective like that!

What the Russians missed was not diplomatic adventurism and high risk plans; it was correct contextualization before all the rest. In fact, Jerusalem was closer to the Russian – Ottoman borderline than Mosul!

- How?

- Through a vision implemented according to the terms of an alliance treaty.

- Why?

- Because the vision ensuing from correct contextualization would lead the Russians to diplomatic success, whereas the military advance against the Ottomans up to Van and Mosul would be perceived as threat by the English and the French who would become pro-Ottoman - for a while - in order to stop the Russian military advance.

Lack of accurate interpretation of historical events

The Russian universities and research centers, academies and diplomatic / military schools are, as we said, abundant in specialists and experts on everything pertaining to the politics, the economies, the societies, the cultures, the religions, the languages, the literatures, the history and art history of the Middle East. Is this enough?

As it happens, the contents of the disciplines of Orientalism studied in Russia matter. When it comes to Orientalism, it is essential to bear in mind that, with the exception of cultures and civilizations developed on Russian territory, the Russian Orientalists were never the pioneering leaders in an Oriental discipline, be it Egyptology, Assyriology or Iranology.

Russians participated very little in, and never led, the efforts toward the decipherment of the Ancient Oriental scriptures, Old Achaemenid Persian, Egyptian Hieroglyphic, Assyrian – Babylonian, Sumerian, Elamite, Hittite, Luwian, Hatti, Hurrian, Urartu, Ugaritic Canaanite, Yemenite, etc., which led to the establishment of a great number of Orientalist disciplines. This was preponderantly a field for the French, the English, the Germans, and the Italians; of course, the Russians followed and after the establishment of the new Orientalist disciplines, there have been many leading Russian Orientalists, but Orientalism was never modeled after Russian thought structure and analytical approach.

Of course, the rise of the Soviet regime led to the formation of an entire academic class of Marxists – Leninists, who methodically stipulated the prerogatives of the Dialectical and Historical Materialism. This was absolutely an original thought and method school with its own interpretational tools, but the rejection of the ‘capitalist’ academic methodology did not open the way for a genuine interpretation of the Antiquity; on the contrary, modern visions and perceptions were excessively and misleadingly projected on the historical periods under study. This caused severe misunderstandings and misrepresentation of the subject.

To offer an example, if one collected on annual basis the contributions published by Soviet Egyptologists, one would be impressed because of the quantity, the amount of articles published, speeches, lectures, and communications given, and books composed. However, although the productivity equaled or even surpassed that of the French or German Egyptologists, the variety of subjects tackled was very limited. More than 95% of the topics were of social, economic or political nature. Very rarely did the Soviet Orientalists focus on subjects related to religion, mythology, rituals, the faiths and the beliefs, the cults, and the spiritual concerns of the ancient peoples.

Of course, they always interpreted the faiths, the beliefs, the ideas, and the concepts as mere coefficient of the local socio-economic parameters and interests. Certainly, the interpretational method was erroneous in and by itself (as simple projection of modern perceptions to the minds of people who lived before 3000 and 4000 years), but the bibliographical level disaster was even worse, as it ended up with a complete transfiguration of the historical reality of the Antiquity. In the end, all that was important for the ancient peoples was almost totally overlooked and forgotten, hidden and almost prohibited.

The formation of the Soviet Orientalist school exercised a certain impact on the formation of the French historiography (mainly the establishment of the French school of the "Annales"), but this dimension is secondary of importance for what is the sociopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Despite the revolutionary theoretical – philosophical background (Dialectical Materialism), the system of the Historical Materialism failed to introduce a really revolutionary approach in the study of the Oriental Civilizations and the Middle East.

Colonial schemes and colonially-imposed situations pertaining to
1. the nation-building procedures for various populations that have been falsely identified with irrelevant nations of the Middle East,
2. the state-controlled educational systems of the Middle Eastern realms and states,
3. the deformation and alteration of the indigenous cultures and behavioural systems, and
4. the political – ideological theories composed and diffused by indigenous students of French and English universities,
never became the object of thorough study of the Soviet Orientalists, who never established – through their rules and methods – an academic criticism of the colonial Orientalism.

Like this, the locally prevailed corrupt situation could not possibly be transformed (except perhaps superficially) by the introduction of a new sociopolitical system – copy of the Soviet Union. For many long years, South Yemen and Abyssinia lived under regimes controlled and supported by Soviet Union.

- In what did these regimes change the anterior colonial structures that were of French and English machination?

- In absolutely nothing! The old structures are still there, in 2008!

And how could the Russians – or anybody else – outfox the anterior colonial structures, if not by deeply studying, accurately appraising, and perfectly understanding them first?

Like this, Soviet Orientalism did not challenge the entire layer of colonial policy implemented in the Middle East since the days of Napoleon through the ceaseless promotion of the related Anglo-French machinations and plans. And as long as Russia does not proceed in this way, Russia will never shape a realistic perception of the Middle East, let alone an unambiguous appreciation of the colonial, Anglo-French targets, and a clear-cut conception of a plan to outmaneuver and ultimately cancel the colonial machinations and plans.

Lack of conceptualization of cultural and political data

In fact, the Russian academic – political – diplomatic establishment does not understand what happened in the Middle East, and to what reason are due this development and that event. It may sound extraordinary, but it also concerns many other great countries acknowledged for their academic communities and successes, namely Germany, Italy, America, Japan, and China, but also India, Mexico, and Brazil.

Mainly, the Russians fail to conceptualize the following critical data:

1. There is no Arab Nation; there are no Arabs. The only to claim to Arab descent are the populations who currently live in the Saudi Arabia – except the Persian Gulf coast. The amalgamation there has been however great as throughout various historical periods Muslims from any other country moved and settled permanently to the Haramayn, the area between Mecca and Medina.

2. The Arabization process is an Anglo-French trickery gear to impose colonial control over the Middle East on permanent basis.

3. The fallacious formation of "Modern Arabs" is a plan involving
a. eradication of millennia long cultures, languages, and religions
b. complete prevention of genuine nation building
c. total lack of authentic National History and Identity (in the case of several, different nations)
d. vast social disorders due to false debates, namely conflicts between traditionalist social – religious leaders and falsely westernized socio-economic elites
e. extremely severe complexes of inferiority generated among the entire population of the colonized and victimized countries
f. peremptorily drawn and absolutely meaningless borderlines geared for the survival of multi-divided and reciprocally loathed, ignorant, extremist, besotted and barbaric elites

4. "Modern Arabic" is a fake language fabricated for the colonial purpose of merging various peoples, culturally and nationally disfigured, in order to re-adjust the entire situation according to the colonial plans

5. The fabricated "Modern Arab" is not a political or national notion; it is mainly a cultural – behavioural notion; it implies that the person
a. misperceives its own national and cultural identity,
b. identifies itself through grave complexes of inferiority toward the colonizers,
c. accommodates itself within the limits of a miserable social environment,
d. expresses itself by means of a very low behavioural system that involves coarse attitude, rigid mentality, vulgar behaviour, negative feelings, and sick sentimentalism,
e. fails to understand the phenomenon of life through concepts, and simply mimics attitudes, behaviours, practices and patterns of the daily life of other peoples (considered as superior – although this is never confessed),
f. perceives life as a continuation of earlier found conditions, without (the need for) any changes – except for the results of simple mimicking, and
g. lives its entire life in sheer barbarism.

6. The arabization, as distortion and eradication of the national identity of the different colonially-victimized peoples, and as system of behavioural barbarization, prepares the environment for the later diffusion of Islamism.

7. Islamic Civilization does not exist anymore.

8. Among the fabricated pseudo-nation of Arabs, Islam - as religion - does not exist anymore.

9. The religion currently practiced among the fabricated pseudo-nation of Arabs is a form of materialism, merged with structural deontology, and absurd dogmatism presented as rationalism. As such, it is a false Islam, a mainly behavioural system, deprived of spiritual, metaphysical, moral, esthetic, and intellectual values. Its philosophical methods of Logic reproduce patterns of Aramaean Rationalism (Tatianus). This system is identified as Islamism, and it helps deliberately confuse – within every individual’s mind – the limits between ‘religion’, ‘education’, ‘culture’ and ‘national identity’ (all in brackets as all are forged and projected on the victimized peoples by the colonial academia and diplomatic elites). The confusion helps turn the individuals into an undividable mass of barbaric mob, and promote mob control – which is carried out by the secret hierarchy of sheikhs.

10. Islamism as system is remotely controlled through supposedly moderate or ostensibly extremist sheikhs residing in England and France. Its members are omnipresent in the various so-called Arab states and societies that in fact are all extremist and untrustworthy.

11. The historically real nations still exist in the Middle East, and are the only with whom an alliance can be made for common benefit. These nations are terribly oppressed and live under threat of linguistic, religious, cultural and therefore national extinction. The real nations (ethno-linguistic and religious groups) of the Middle East are the following:

I. The Berbers of NW Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania.
In fact, the Arabic speaking populations in all these countries are not Arabs but linguistically (not racially) arabized Berbers, victims of the colonial arabization project.

II. The Copts of Egypt.
In fact, the Arabic speaking populations in Egypt are not Arabs but linguistically (not racially) arabized Copts (Egyptians), victims of the colonial arabization project.

III. The Nubians of Egypt and the Sudan.

IV. The Aramaeans of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Kuwait, Qatar, and the Emirates.
In fact, the Arabic speaking populations in all these countries are not Arabs but linguistically (not racially) arabized Aramaeans, victims of the colonial arabization project. Along with them, one must count the Arabic speaking populations of SE Turkey and SW Iran. Furthermore, the so-called Assyrians, and the so-called Chaldaeans of Iraq and Iran are in fact Aramaeans, and their language and scripture are Aramaic; they fell victims of the Anti-Aramaean hysteria of France, England, and the colonial missionaries who fueled discord, diffusing false national identity among them.

To say it otherwise, the Aramaeans, the so-called Assyrians, and the so-called Chaldaeans (who all speak Aramaic) are the only Aramaeans who still speak Aramaic, whereas all the victims of the colonial project of arabization have been linguistically (but not racially) arabized.

V. The Azeris (in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Iran, Georgia and Turkey).

VI. The Turkmens (in Iraq, but mainly in Iran).

VII. The Loris (in Iran).

VIII. The Bakhtiaris (in Iran).

IX. The Baluchis (in Iran and Pakistan).

X. The Zazas (falsely associated with Kurds; in Turkey).

XI. The Dimlis (falsely associated with Kurds; in Turkey).

XII. The Kurmandjis (Kurds, in Turkey and Syria).

XIII. The Bahdinanis (Kurds, in Iraq).

XIV. The Mokris (falsely associated with Kurds; in Iran and Iraq).

XV. The Soranis (falsely associated with Kurds; in Iran and Iraq).

XVI. The Hawleris (falsely associated with Kurds; in Iraq, Arbil).

XVII. The Goranis (falsely associated with Kurds; in Turkey and in Iran).

XVIII. The Lakis (falsely associated with Kurds; in Iran).

XIX. The Kalhoris (falsely associated with Kurds; in Iran).

XX. The Yazidi Kurds (in Iraq – religious group).

XXI. The Ahl-e Haq Goranis (mainly in Iran – religious group).

XXII. The Mazandaranis (in Iran).

XXIII. The Gilakis (in Iran).

XXIV, The Dhofaris (in Oman).

XXV. The Mahranis and the Soqotris (in Yemen).

XXVI. The Bejas (mainly in Sudan, but also in Eritrea and Egypt).

XXVII. The Furis (Darfur, Sudan).

XXVIII. The Somalis (in Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, and tyrannized Ogaden – Abyssinia).

XXIX. The Hausas of Sudan’s Kordofan.

XXX. The Fulanis of Sudan’s Kordofan.

XXXI. The Kushitic people of the central provinces of Sudan (linguistically arabized) – descendants of the Meroites and Makkurians of pre-Islamic Sudan.
Note: the Dinkas and the Nuers of South Sudan cannot be considered as part of the wider Middle East, as they constitute part of an exclusively African social - cultural environment.

XXXII. The Afars (divided in Eritrea, Djibouti, and Abyssinia).

XXXIII. The Kunamas (in Eritrea).

XXXIV. The Tigrinya and Tigre speaking Abyssinians (in Eritrea and Abyssinia).
Note: the Amhara Abyssinians do not constitute an independent nation, being an amalgamation of Tigrinya speaking Abyssinians with various African nations.

XXXV. The Agaws (tyrannically included in Abyssinia).

XXXVI. The Oromos (tyrannically included in Abyssinia).
Note: The Kushitic and Nilo-Saharan peoples of the south of Abyssinia, namely the Sidamas, the Shekachos, the Kaffas, the Kambattas, the Anuak, and others – like the Dinkas and the Nuers of South Sudan - cannot be considered as part of the wider Middle East, as they constitute part of an exclusively African social - cultural environment.

12. Consequently, any real chance for Russia to increase its influence / impact on the Middle East would signify the following:
a. Complete rejection of the landmass invasion / expansion concept,
b. Selection of the correct alliances among various ethno-religious groups, either independently or with other players, namely Turkey, America, and China,
c. Pertinent comprehension of the fact that the present Arab states do not consist in viable nations,
d. Proper formulation of a plan for the substitution of the targeted ‘Arab’ states by other genuine nations that will undergo an authentic nation building process,
e. Establishment of a special university – research center – diplomacy school with focus on the refutation of the Colonial Orientalism and the formation of local leaderships with strong inclination to national identity, cultural and religious preservation and cultivation,
f. Demolition of the targeted ‘Arab’ states; replacement of these states by new nations inclined to promote genuine national and cultural identity, and
g. Creation of an Alliance of the Genuine Oriental nations against the Pan-Arabist Barbarism.

Conclusions

For too long, Russians projected in the Middle East concepts elaborated for the vast Russian / Soviet territory; this cannot work further, as it only damages Russian interests from Mauritania to Oman, and from Syria to Somalia.

Promoting Freedom, Human Rights, Democracy, Cultural Identity, and Nation-Building, Russia should identify its Middle Eastern policy around the following axes:

1. Alliance with Algerian – Berberic political groups, formation of Berberic elites, and contribution to the formation of a Berberic state in part of Algeria’s territory.

2. Alliance with Sudanese – Beja political groups, formation of Beja elites, and contribution to the formation of a Beja state throughout Sudan’s Red Sea province and coast.

3. Active contribution to Peace and Unification in Somalia.

4. Alliance with Kushitic Oromo political groups, cooperation with Oromo elites, and contribution to the formation of an Oromo state of Kushitic Ethiopia with capital at Finfinne (fallaciously called Addis Ababa by the Abyssinian invaders).

5. Alliance with Yemenite – Mahrani and Soqotri political groups, formation of Mahrani and Soqotri elites, and contribution to the formation of a Mahran state in the southeastern part of Yemen’s territory.

6. Alliance with the Yemenite elites of Saada, support of their heroic fight for independence from the cruel Pan-Arabist totalitarian regime of Sanaa, contribution to the formation of a Sheba state in the northernmost part of Yemen’s territory, and subsequent promotion of the Najran separatist movement in the south-westernmost confines of Saudi Arabia.

7. Alliance with Baluchi political groups, formation of Baluchi elites, and contribution to the formation of a Baluchi state in parts of Iran’s and Pakistan’s territory.

8. Alliance with Dhofari political groups, formation of Dhofari elites, and contribution to the formation of a Dhofari state in part of Oman’s territory.

9. Alliance with Aramaean political groups in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon and the Diaspora, formation of national Aramaean elites, and contribution to the formation of an Oriental Christian, Aramaean state in parts of Syria’s, Lebanon’s and Iraq’s territory.

Note
Picture: A successful Russian policy in the Middle East should follow the vision of Nikolai Rimsky Korsakov’s Tale of the Tsar Saltan up to the Legendary Island of Buyan.